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Avenida das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal ricardorps2000@yahoo.com External interventions are a mechanism the international community uses for conlict management in a country. Intervention efects are determined by the motivations of the intervening parties and the efectiveness of the military, economic or diplomatic initiatives undertaken. But, at the same time, the relationship between interventions and conlict is endogenous, which makes it diicult to determine when interventions are causing a conlict patern or when interventions are responses to conlict paterns.
It has been suggested that the expected efect of external interventions on civil wars is to de-escalate conlict intensity in order to allow a mediation process to unfold. This is atributed directly not only to diplomatic initiatives but also to military and economic initiatives. The underlying assumption is that interveners' motives, regardless of the type of intervention, are primarily "peace promoting" (Regan, 2002a) . This paper questions this assumption by examining how military and diplomatic interventions and interveners' motivations are associated with conlict intensity. The paper aims to contribute to the broader literature in international interventions and conlict management.
The paper starts by presenting the theoretical formulation that external interventions are mainly conlict management mechanisms we then propose three expected mechanisms for military and diplomatic interventions and interveners' motivations. The proposed mechanisms are then tested on a case study of Somalia for the period to . For the sake of clarity, the conlict-interventions analysis is sub-divided into four periods. The data is based on secondary sources relying on a conlict event dataset for a monthly account of batle-related deaths as a measure of conlict intensity.
In the inal section we present the results which show that it is the combination of type and target of interventions which determines the efect of interventions on conlict intensity. We also show that conlict intensity does not seem to determine interveners' interventions, meaning that more bloodshed does not increase the chance of more interventions.
External interventions and conlict intensity
A broad conceptualisation of interventions would consider that they can be forcible or non-forcible, direct or indirect (through the use of a proxy state), open or clandestine (covert) operations perpetrated by state and non-state actors and are not necessarily lawful or unlawful but should break the conventional patern of international relations (Vincent, 1974, p. 13 ).
More speciically, for the case of intra-state conlict, Regan a and Rosenau deine external interventions as convention-breaking military, economic or political activities in the internal afairs of a foreign country that are targeted at the authority structures of the government (biased, in support of the government or the opposition, or neutral , with the aim of afecting the balance of power between the parties in the conlict. There are diferent types of interventions, for instance the traditional peacekeeping operations normally with a neutral mandate, and military, economic or diplomatic interventions which can be both in support of only one side or neutral 2 . This deinition is associated with the traditional conceptualisation of civil war as a state (with a government) that is challenged by at least one political group using armed force over a sustained period and producing a minimum threshold of deaths. "atle deaths are a clear indication of the extraordinary nature of the period under review even if the conlict is protracted and of the intensity of conlict Gleditsch et al., 2002) .
Since 1991 Somalia has usually been referred to as an extreme case of "state collapse", a country characterized by a constellation of commercial city-states and villages separated by areas of pastoral statelessness without a central authority Menkhaus, . In this sense, the identiication of a state is more formal than de facto in Somalia, where there is a more decentralized form of conlict. In this way, the civil war in Somalia is not only of a state-based type, associated with conlict involving an internationally recognized group representing the state , which in Somalia was the case with two transitional governments, being challenged by other group s , but involves conlicts of other types.
Despite the ethnic homogeneity, Somalian society is characterised by a clan system structured around six major clan families (the Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir, the Hawiye, the Rahanwein and the Digil), which then break down into subclans. The clan families are "communities of relations" with common genealogy and complex networks of relationships (Ssereo, 2003) . Typically, clan militia respond to clan elders but operate in a decentralised and opportunistic guerrilla fashion. Linked to both "state collapse" and clan politics are the warlords, who are characterised by their personal rule paradigm, the monopolization of economic resources and the extensive use of coercion through militias (Clapham, 2 In this deinition interventions are neutral in the sense that they are provided to both sides or do not directly increase the ighting capabilities of the parties. Examples of the former are the provision of economic support to both sides and military support to both sides to oversee a ceaseire or a demilitarized zone. " classic example of the later is the provision of mediators.
. They also oppose any efort to impose government in the capital, in this way avoiding predatory government practices (Menkhaus, 2007) it is assumed that third parties do not intervene to exacerbate or prolong the ighting. The key issue here is the desire by the intervener to bring stability to a speciic region; one approach for achieving this -and the one that is under consideration -is the active intervention by a third party into the ongoing conlict p. .
One way to achieve this is by the intervener trying to bolster one side to compel the opposing side to quit ighting, which can come about through a ceaseire or one side's defeat (Regan, 1996, p. 340) . The missing link in this argument is that the peaceful objectives of interveners are conditional on who would be the possible winner in a conlict. "n intervention indiferent to the outcome of a conlict and focused solely on de-escalation or ending the conlict would primarily support the strongest side so that victory would be more likely. It has been proposed that a victory is the most decisive outcome to a conlict and the one type 3 It is relevant to highlight that it is not clear if "state collapse" precedes or is a consequence of warlordism and that warlords in Somalia are not necessarily clan based (Marchal, 2007) . 4 State collapse cannot be equated with criminality and armed conlict as areas of non-existent state authority have enjoyed peace and the rule of law at the same time that areas with state authority have been prone to conlict. This means the assumption is not that state collapse leads to conlict in Somalia, but that in the context of state collapse diferent types of conlict occur. The three types of conlict state based, non-state based and one-sided violence will inform the empirical analysis. less likely to lead to conlict recurrence, specially in identity civil wars Licklider, 1995) . In the cases where a military victory seems unlikely, an alternative strategy could be to support the weaker side to the extent that a military stalemate is reached possibly by increasing its ighting capability , forcing both parties to engage in negotiations, which could eventually lead to a lasting peace agreement. Studies also suggest that a comprehensive peace agreement implemented through a peace operation has a beter success rate in securing peace than a military victory (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006) .
In either case, interveners are more likely to pay close atention to the conditions of the conlict and simultaneously to which parties would beter represent the interests of the interveners. If a preferred party is losing the war, it is more likely it will be supported to remove the possibility of its military defeat.
Additionally, if negotiations are being pursued, external parties can add extra conditions on the political solutions to be found and therefore make it more dificult to reach an agreement.
Even the sub-set of interventions that occur after the end of intense ighting, especially the ones targeting the implementation of a peace agreement but also following a victory or a de-escalation of the conlict, can be prone to conlict. Therefore, on the one hand, the assumption is that interventions are not intended to exacerbate the ighting, but on the other hand, an intervention may have unintended consequences or may intentionally bolster one side of the conlict, regardless of its efect on the conditions that would lead to a faster peace. This paper looks precisely at this tension and proposes that interveners may not be motivated initially to stop the ighting in this case by lowering intensity .
It considers that external interventions in conlict processes refer mainly to the balancing of capabilities between groups (Regan, 2010) connected to the goals or objectives of interveners and combatants. The interventions can aim to ensure a group's victory or its demise, to enhance the position of the groups in negotiation processes or to reach a stalemate so that negotiations can begin. This may mean an escalation e.g. through direct military support or imposing unatainable negotiation positions) or de-escalation (e.g. by withholding military support or promoting mediation of the conlict. This deinition departs from Regan in the sense that it more clearly formulates that interveners promote peace if they can but through conlict if they must.
Efects of external interventions on conlict intensity
The focus of the analysis is the efect of external interventions on conlict intensity. "ecause of the focus on conlict intensity, the choice of a single case study is appropriate, as variation of intensity can be observed across time. Nevertheless, quantitative studies of conlict have focused more on conlict duration than on conlict intensity. "ecause of this research scarcity and because conlict duration can be considered a measure of (sustained) intensity, this literature is used as a reference for inference on expected mechanisms. (Regan & Meachum, 2014) . Furthermore, it is diicult to ascertain whether it is the high intensity that attracts interventions or it is the interventions that cause the high intensity conlict.
Studies have identiied that bloodier wars atract more interventions Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000) , which is in contrast to the proposal that interventions are more likely to end conlict in high-intensity conlicts but are less likely to occur (Regan, 2002a) .
In one study military interventions have been found to decrease conlict duration when the support is provided to the challenging group Collier, Hoeler & Söderbom, .
The majority of indings support the proposition of an association between military interventions and higher conlict intensity, although the causality of the process is less certain. The efect of economic interventions is less pronounced and therefore no hypothesis is formulated.
Hypothesis Military interventions are associated with, and lead to, higher conlict intensity.
The most frequently used diplomatic intervention is mediation, which occurs with the consent of both parties and is therefore closer to the conlict manage- Considering these results, it can be proposed that there is a positive relationship between diplomatic interventions and conlict de-escalation.
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Hypothesis Diplomatic interventions are associated with, and lead to, decreased conlict intensity.
Finally, interveners' motives can be self-centred; for example, they could be related to territorial acquisition or to regional stability, protection of the intervener's diplomatic, economic or military interests, ideology, speciic international politics and superpower rivalry and domestic and organisational politics. The intervener's motives might also be related to cultural ainities with people in the target countries. Interventions can be more solidarist or legalist as in the upholding of human rights, stopping genocide, promoting democracy or the moral commitment of an intervening state (Regan, 1996 (Regan, , 2002a (Regan, , 2010 . In most cases, interveners' motivations are exogenous to the conlict and even UN interventions occur for reasons other than the human catastrophe of conlict Suhrke & Noble, 1977; Mullenbach, 2005) . Due to the diiculty of identifying motives in interventions it has been proposed that instead the main mechanisms of interests are the political objectives of interveners (Sullivan & Koch, 2009 ). These can be expressed operationally by the biased or neutral nature and type of interventions but also can be inferred from the context in which interventions occur.
While throughout the Cold War states valued sovereignty and order more than human rights when considering interventions, in the 1990s the case for humanitarian interventions gain adherence, to the extent that military intervention authorized by the United Nations Security Council became an acceptable option in cases of genocide or mass killing. Moreover humanitarian motivations are increasingly used to justify a range of military operations (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2005) . This practice would become the norm of the "Responsibility to Protect" which gave the international community a responsibility in securing that states protect the populations from mass atrocities, in last resort by undertaking external military interventions. But, despite these formulations actors are motivated by a complexity of self-centred and altruistic factors. Since the 1990s, interventions have occurred both within and outside the realm of the "Responsibility to Protect", with often disputed humanitarian claims. An investigation of the link of each intervention to its humanitarian objectives is out of the scope of the present work, nevertheless an account of the extent to which the interventions are responsive to local humanitarian conditions is possible. Assuming that the more intense is the ighting the more acute is the humanitarian situation, it is possible to formulate that conlict intensity does not unequivocally atract interventions.
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These hypotheses will be tested for the Somalia conlict for the period be- 
Map Somalia
Source: United Nations (UN) 5 The analysis focuses on central and south Somalia where most conlict occurred after , and therefore
Puntland or Somaliland is referred to only in connection with it. Aidid, which had its roots in a nomadic lifestyle (Rutherford, 2008) . The contest would lead to intense ighting for control of the capital, Mogadishu, in the last quarter of 1991 and in the south of Somalia in January 1992, which claimed more than 4,000 lives in four months (Melander & Sundberg, 2011) 8 .
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos • julho-dezembro de • , -
In January 1992 several external actors (the UN, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, the African Union -AU and Ethiopia mediated on the conlict, which led to a ceaseire agreement signed on March , with provisions for a transitional governance mechanism and a peace-keeping mission (DADM, 2012). As a result, the conlict de-escalated and crystallised into the separation of Mogadishu along the 6 In the narrative only relevant interventions are identiied, even if Figure 1 identiies more interventions.
7 The SNM did not recognize the Mogadishu government, and on May 18, 1991 declared the northwestern Somali regions independent as the republic of Somaliland. Ethiopia supported the SNM. 8 In the south two rival warlords, General Siad "Morgan" and Colonel Omar Jess, fought for control of the important coastal city of Kismayo (Adebajo, 2011) .
Figure "atle deaths and external interventions in Somalia, -
On the left axis are monthly batle-related deaths for state-based and non state-based conlict and monthly deaths for one-sided conlict. Number of interventions on the right axis is identiied for the date of initiation. Timeline axes with year start. For months with more than batle deaths, the total number of deaths is reported in a label on top of the chart in the corresponding month. (Rutherford, 2008) . With the exception of Mogadishu, up to the early 1990s the nature of the conlict in the south was mainly inter-clan, with the Darood SPM) and Hawiye (USC opposing each other. This conlict, which was characterised by atrocities and looting, involved fast-moving campaigns in which large slices of land were seized (Menkhaus, 2004) .
The lack of authority and the transition of governance during this period are particularly prone to conlict. There was an end-of-hierarchy moment Cramer, 2002) when the fall of the Barre regime opened up a space for various parties to contest authority. The period signalled a transition (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates & Gleditsch, 2001) from autocracy to what would become an anarchic, decentralized, stateless system in which "contenders struggle to conquer and defend durable resources, without efective regulation by higher authority Hirshleifer, 1995, p. 27 ). The possibility of reaching an agreement that would hold under these conditions came about as a result of a "military stalemate" (Zartman, 2001) and international pressure which ofered incentives to the parties to allow humanitarian interventions to take place as well as guaranteeing that there would be no interference in the dynamics of the conlict. Also, Aidid distrusted Boutros-Ghali, who was considered a pro-Barre person since his tenure as deputy foreign minister of Egypt (Adebajo, 2011) .
Later in the same year, on December 6, the UN authorized a peace enforcement mission (UNSC 794/1992) in the southern half of the country, an objective that was ultimately achieved (Rutherford, 2008) 9 .
Also in March 1993 and without consulting General Aidid, an expanded UNOSOM II (UNSC 814/1993) was approved (Rutherford, 2008) . This time the UNOSOM II had Chapter VII enforcement powers, an authorized force for 1993 of 28,000 personnel and the mission's mandate change from feeding the population to a large nation-building project including the disarmament of militias.
This illustrates the change of policy that occurred during the 1990s from a focus on humanitarian interventions to a focus on conlict resolution and postwar reconstruction Duield, , alongside the emergence of the third generation of peacekeeping operations operating with Chapter VII mandates but without a comprehensive acceptance by the conlict parties Doyle & Sambanis, 10 .
On June 5, 1993, the March Agreement was broken when General Aidid's forces atacked UN troops. This was a frequent occurrence and atacks were also directed at UNITAF troops Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen, .
In an escalation of the confrontations, a UN-mandated manhunt was initiated to capture the faction leader, General Aidid, which led to the Somalis considering the UN was a warring faction. In this process the "Black Hawk Down" incident occurred in the US-led Operation, Gothic Serpent, on October 3, 1993.
Eighteen US troops died in that incident and it was estimated that there were 1,000 deaths among General Aidid's military supporters and civilians (Adebajo, 2011 (Melander & Sundberg, 2011) .
9 Nevertheless the humanitarian achievements of the intervention have been questioned (Weiss, 1999, pp. 82-87) . 10 First generation peacekeeping are interposition forces deployed after a truce is reached under the banner of impartiality, neutrality and consent. Second generation peacekeeping are the multidimensional operations with the consent of the parties. Fourth generation are the delegated peacekeeping operations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006) .
This period was characterised by a process in which a light humanitarian intervention gradually assumed enforcement powers, to end up being a political mission atempting to remove a warlord "ets, .
Nevertheless, in spite of the failure to establish peace in the country and the continuation of a stateless conlict, the intervention decreased the intensity of the conlict signiicantly from early until the middle of , with the exception of a few periods. "lso, the conlict became more localised, briefer and less costly in terms of human lives, and with less damage to property. At the same time, atrocities and looting became less common and warlords became less of a factor vis a vis the relevance of clan conlict Menkhaus, .
From 1991 onwards centrifugal forces fragmented the clan families, which led to intra-clan rivalries, in the case of Mogadishu with conlict over a single city block (Menkhaus, 2003) . Notwithstanding other relevant processes and actors, Menkhaus's (2007) proposition that since the signing of the Djibouti agreement in , the conlict in Somalia could be seen as a contest for control of political and economic power in Mogadishu between two factions of the Hawiye clan General "idid and "li Mahdi's clans is conirmed in the above analysis of the process and the conlict itself.
November 99 to May -Intra/inter clan conlict and ascension of the ICU amidst international disengagement and regional eforts for mediation
In November 1996, in Sodere, Ethiopia, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiated mediation initiatives between 26 faction leaders (Dagne, 2010) , with follow-up meetings throughout 1997 mediated by Ethiopia.
But this negotiation process collapsed when Egypt convened a meeting of Somali groups in Cairo in December 1997, which led to the Cairo Declaration on Somalia (ibid. . The agreement included provisions for a ceaseire and an interim government but was not signed by some parties and would never be implemented (Harbom et al., 2006) . This initiative would also lose momentum when another peace conference was convened in Somalia in 1998.
The conlict between February and February featured several clashes of lower intensity, mainly in central and south Somalia, involving not only the USC/SNA and the USC/SSA but also a series of other forces. The frequency and intensity of the ighting would only decrease temporarily with the initiation of the Somali Reconciliation Conference in May 2000 (see Figure 1 ) 11 .
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos • julho-dezembro de • , -
This peace process was mediated internationally (Arab League, Libya and IGAD and involved a meeting of delegates in Djibouti it was boycoted by several powerful warlords as well as the governments of Somaliland and Puntland [Dagne, 2010] On September , the terrorists atacks in the United States would reconceptualise security concerns worldwide with implications for Somalia. The attacks were linked to an Islamist group, Al-Qaeda, which had struck before in the region on August 7, 1998, when it bombed the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Dagne, 2010) .
In the aftermath of the 1993 "Black Hawk Down" incident the United States (US ignored Somalia but its policy changed because of its need to ight "l-Qaeda.
Initially the US recruited warlords to seize terrorist suspects in the country (Hartley, 2006) . A consequence of this policy was a decrease in the power of the transitional government (Hartley, 2005) and in the power of clan structures, reinforcing the power of warlords. Another consequence was that the US support to warlords had a backlash by increasing Somali support for the Islamic alternative of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, which would grow in the following years (Scahill, 2011 this negotiation process some of the conlict in the "ay region and Puntland related to previous tensions between the clans and leaders of the administrative region turned violent when criteria had to be used to select participants in this mediation process (Menkhaus, 2004) . The irst phase of the process involved the signing of ceaseire agreements, which the parties routinely broke. Despite this, phase two was initiated. It intended to address the root causes of the conlict and focused on how to address issues related to territorial occupation and conquest in southern Somalia (Menkhaus, 2006) . But negotiations were fruitless and the mediators decided to move to phase three of a power-sharing agreement (Menkhaus, 2007) . it was formed along the principle of a consociational democracy, based on clan families' representation. On October , , "bdullahi Yusuf was elected president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by an electoral college based on a coalition pact instead of a national unity project. The swearing-in ceremony was atended by heads of government from "frican countries and representatives from regional organisations and the United Nations (Dagne, 2010) . "bdullahi Yusuf was closer to Ethiopia and while in oice he followed a policy of imposing a victor's peace on the adversaries -the TNG and the "Mogadishu group" (Menkhaus, 2007) .
The creation of the TFG and its policies provoked a reaction in Mogadishu where a militant youth -the Shabaab -developed and began assassinating TFG members and supporters (ICG, 2005) . In this context, the United States reinforced the programme of capturing suspected Al-Qaeda members in the country (Bruton, 2010) . "etween December and early most of the conlict involved several other parties besides the TFG and occurred throughout central and southern 13 Besides assault and capture, covert operations can also be of surveillance and reconnaissance.
External interventions and civil war intensity in south-central Somalia (1991 Somalia ( -2010 
Somalia, not only in Mogadishu, and spread to villages in the Shabelle and Bay regions. Most of the ighting was intra-clan or intra-faction rivalry, with some inter-clan and inter-factional conlict. There were fewer instances of conlict directly involving the TFG or against civilians (see Figure 1 ).
This period was characterised by opposing regional interests playing out diplomatic initiatives, which pre-empted any chance of successful agreement. The Somalia conlict becomes a proxy for the regional dispute between countries of the Muslim Arab world, headed by Egypt, and of the Christian Horn of Africa region, headed by Ethiopia. It was a dispute that also extended to the military support provided to the parties throughout the conlict 14 . The rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia can be atributed to each being a regional power and the competition between both countries over the Nile's water (Dehéz & Gebrewold, 2010) , with Somalia constituting a counterweight to Ethiopian control of the Nile (Bradbury, 2008) .
The main diplomatic initiatives would not be directly associated to conlict in- The ICU had been established in mid-2005 and its rise to power was due to the growing inluence of the courts as a source of law and order, the support of the business community that was interested mainly in public security and the clan-based backlash against international eforts to counter terrorism and state 14 See, for instance, Egypt's involvement in (UN, 2006 , the same year of the Ethiopian military intervention. 15 During this period there were three Somali-led peace processes not identiied in the narrative due to their national nature: the Idale peace process (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , the Jijeele and Gaalje'el peace process (Hiran, 2007) and the Mudug-Galgadud peace process (2005) (2006) (2007) (Johnson, 2009) . 16 Salaism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas demanding a return to traditional Islamic practices (Kepel, 2002) , and jihadism refers to the struggle against those who do not believe in Islam.
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• , -building through warlords (Bruton, 2010) . The ICU was initially aligned with the "Mogadishu group" but in 2005 a rift developed between both as a result of a regional administration dispute which led to them becoming two distinct interest groups (ICG, 2006) . In the months ahead, this would enable the ICU to further capitalize on the population's desire to terminate warlords' power 17 (Hartley, 2005) .
In tandem with the rise of the ICU, the United States promoted the establish- There was a series of dynamics of ICU control in the second half of 2006. One dynamic was that for the irst time since , Mogadishu was not immersed in the mayhem of warlords' wars; some order and security had been established and some services were reported to have been provided (Scahill, 2011; Hartley, 2006) . This was largely the result of an authoritarian ICU, concentrating power by:
replacing non-central authorities with the courts; forbidding civil society groups;
replacing customary law with sharia law; ending neighbourhood watch patrols; 17 In 2005 a short lived civic movement emerged out of the Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan (MSSP) against the war-prone political elite in the city (Menkhaus, 2007) . 18 Puntland and Somaliland oppose the ICU.
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and marginalizing some traditional elders, civic leaders and business people (Menkhaus, 2006) . Another dynamic was that within the traditionally moderate Islamic population of Somalia the ICU had become radicalized. Among the measures taken was a ban on Western cultural expressions, a prohibition of the popular stimulant qat and an increase in taxes on the business community (Bruton, Hartley, . "ut a more signiicant dynamic, especially for the Ethiopian decision to intervene decisively later in 2006, was the ICU's position on calls for jihad against Ethiopia; appeals to the people of Ethiopia to overthrow its government; close links with Eritrea; the provision of logistical support and bases to two armed insurgent groups opposing the Ethiopian Government, which had increased activity in the country; and a revival of the "greater Somalia" project, with territorial claims in all of Somalia's neighbouring countries, but especially to the Ogaden region, over which Ethiopia and Somalia fought between 1977 and 1978 (Menkhaus, 2007) 19 . Moreover, the possibility of a stable Islamic-inspired country emerging in Somalia could be seen as a platform to strengthen the Muslim population of Ethiopia, the biggest group after the orthodox Christians. "etween June and October Ethiopia unsuccessfully atempted negotiations between the TFG and the UIC (Aimé, 2013) . By October Ethiopia declared it was "technically at war" with the ICU, and on December 24, with an overwhelming force of about , troops ighting alongside the TFG troops, it launched an ofensive against the UIC, unseating it from Mogadishu on December 28, 2006 (Menkhaus, 2007) 
20
. This changed the dynamic and intensity of the conlict signiicantly.
Formally, the Ethiopian regime justiied the non-authorised intervention in
Somalia on the grounds of the right to individual and collective self-defence against a terrorist threat from a regime that could harbour terrorists. It was also argued that the intervention was in response to a request by "bdullahi Yusuf, (Norland, 2006) . 20 Throughout 2005 and Ethiopia proposed this mission to be executed through IGAD, but despite the backing of the AU, it failed to get the necessary regional and international support (Sousa, 2013) .
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gional power ighting the war on terror Prime Minister Meles Zenawi assumed an important role, which outweighed concerns over human rights. In the end the Ethiopian regime would continue to receive aid and diplomatic support from the international community, including the United States (Aimé, 2013) . Two speciic sources of external support require highlighting. One was the US's unequivocal support for the Ethiopian intervention, even if such support was not necessarily operational (Bruton, 2010; Scahill, 2011) . In either case, it is considered that the Ethiopian ofensive would have occurred, regardless of the US support and therefore could not be considered per se as a subcontract of the "war on terror" (Menkhaus, 2007) . But although Ethiopia intervened regularly in Somalia to weaken Islamist militant groups or strengthen allies (Bradbury, 2008) would resort to guerrilla tactics, pledged alliance to Al-Qaeda (Scahill, 2011) , and saw the second top igure in "l-Qaeda, "yman al-Zawahiri, call for a jihad against 
with its leadership concentrated on the southern coast and in the port city of Kismayo. By January 2010 insurgent groups were still in control of most of southcentral Somalia (Dagne, 2010) .
The foreign presence in Somalia, especially of Ethiopians and Americans, was the main contributing factor to the high conlict intensity during this period by increasing the capacity of the Al-Shabaab to recruit local and foreign jihadists. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia was seen as an occupation reviving Somalian nationalism. At the same time, it was a source of serious human rights violations that were also perpetrated by the TFG and African Union (Bruton, 2010) 22 . Furthermore, the United States was perceived as a supporter of the Ethiopian troops as it had launched missile atacks against ICU leaders in January 2007 that caused numerous civilian casualties (Menkhaus, 2007) .
The replacement of Ethiopian troops was a political and military priority. (Bruton, 2010) .
Even though it had to rely exclusively on the poorly stafed AMISOM, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops occurred in January 2009. At the end of the intervention it is estimated that about 6,000 Ethiopian troops were still deployed; therefore, the intervention force totalled around 10,000 troops in 2009 (Aimé, 2013) .
To compensate for the Ethiopian troop withdrawal, the International Conference on Somalia held in Brussels in April 2009 decided to increase the reimburse-22 For instance, the TFG was involved in indiscriminate shelling of civilian neighbourhoods and withholding food aid in the midst of famine (Menkhaus, 2007) . More generally, and according to Merkhaus (2007) , this period was also a continuation of the Hawiye intra-clan conlict, with the UIC being an Islamic cover for a Hawiye sub-clan the Haber Gedir "yr to ight the equally Hawiye sub-clan of the ARPCT. Nevertheless, the confrontation with the TFG was more of an interclan afair as the TFG was of the Darood clan, which was dominated mainly by the Mijerteen sub-clan.
Results
In Somalia a unique combination of factors has determined internal and external actors' conlict behaviour. Internal factors even if they have external links are the main divisive elements in inter-and intra-clan conlictive culture, which exists in tandem with warlordism. These actors often engage in opportunistic behaviour, shortsighted politics and zero-sum views, which result in an abundance of spoilers for peace building, state building and central authority projects.
This conluence of internal and external spoiler behaviours exist together with other structural factors such as environmental degradation (drought, erosion, deforestation), poverty, legacies of colonization and Cold War geopolitics, demographic pressures, diaspora or the ethnic composition of the country. A divisive
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issue in the country is the control of resources (Dias, 2013) , either renewable resources, mainly land and water, or control of the state and economy, particularly of the livestock trade, which is associated with the pastoralist culture.
The efects of military interventions on conlict intensity depend on the nature of the conlict and the objectives of the intervention. Two main overarching periods can be identiied in Somalia. During the irst, from to , the conlict was mainly of an inter-and intra-clan nature of lower intensity and with regional links the second period occurred after when the conlict assumed a higher intensity because of its religious Islamic nature and associations people ascribed to it with the "global war on terror" (Hoehne, 2009) .
Within this context the case study shows that neutral military interventions have the capacity to decrease conlict intensity, and they normally happen after a peace agreement is established. Partisan military interventions, intended to increase the capacity of one side, lead to an escalation of the conlict if both sides are being supported. The early 1990s interventions by the US and UN occurred in the context of a relative stalemate in the conlict and had humanitarian objectives therefore, they left the political-military balance in the ield untouched. Such missions were able to decrease conlict intensity. When the mission's mandate was changed in with potential efects on the balance of the parties' capabilities, it faced violent resistance and the intervener decided to withdraw.
The military intervention initiated in 2006 to support the TFG (which involved Ethiopia, Kenya and the AMISOM) aimed to alter the balance of capabilities in favour of the TFG. This support was counterbalanced by support for the Islamic groups (especially from Eritrea) and anti-intervention feelings from Somalis. The result was that no party was able to acquire an overwhelming capacity to defeat its opponents.
Diplomatic interventions, which are neutral, have been associated with lower conlict intensity, but have no causal efect if they are partisan. Neutral mediations throughout the conlict period have led to periods of decreased conlict intensity, although never full peace, due to the number of spoilers. Such was the case in the early 1990s and 1997. But if the mediations are partisan, in support of one side or another, they have no impact on conlict intensity, regardless of achieving peace agreements, such as between 1998 and 2003.
Contrary to expectations, there are three situations in which diplomatic interventions may lead to higher conlict intensity. The irst is in determining which parties are entitled to be at the negotiation table. This had at least two manifestations: one in 1993 when clans were favoured for negotiations in detriment of civic and traditional authority, therefore seting incentives for eligibility on the side of militias. The other manifestation was in 2004 when parties competed for eligibility for admission to the negotiation table. A second situation refers to when an agreement is reached but is not all-inclusive and leaves out parties who then engage in high-intensity ighting to signal their relevance. Such was the case in 1991, when the agreement was rendered void. A third situation is when negotiations fail and the parties become commited to a military solution, having exhausted a political process, as happened in 2006.
High-intensity conlict atracts more neutral interventions, such as military interventions with a humanitarian objective and diplomatic interventions, as in the early post-Cold War era. But in the post-September 11 "global war on terror" higher intensity conlict with radical Islamic groups acquiring power led to partisan military interventions in support of the internationally recognised government. Diplomatic initiatives are associated with both higher and lower conlict intensity periods.
Conclusion
This study focuses on national peace processes but recognizes this as a limitation. Lowering the level of analysis to the micro level of regions' or villages' initiatives could enhance the explanatory power of interventions in conlict, especially regarding the efect of diplomatic initiatives not supported by external actors or the relevance of which peace plans are being discussed and how appropriate they are for dealing with the challenges Somalia faces (Bradbury, 2008) .
The assumption that external interventions are mainly peace promoting can be traced back to the late 1990s when a framework was developed to protect people in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide -the responsibility to protect. In this paper interventions are to be justiied not only when civilian populations are targeted, but also more broadly when conlict intensity has increased signiicantly. Military, economic and diplomatic interventions are tools actors use to inluence the outcomes of conlict. Diferent types of interventions afect conlict intensity diferently, and diferent objectives of the same type of intervention have diferent results. Partisan military interventions escalate conlict while neutral interventions have no signiicant efect. Partisan diplomatic interventions that support both sides have no efect on conlict intensity, but if they are neutral, they can be associated with lower conlict intensity. The motivations of the actors did not seem to be directly linked to conlict intensity, speciically after the middle of the 1990s. Overall, the assumption that interventions promote peace is rejected. Instead, the peace objective may compete with other objectives in a constellation of external and internal actors' motivations and initiatives.
